Economic insecurity and the rise of the right by Bossert, Walter et al.
Economic insecurity and the rise of the right
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103442/
Version: Published Version
Monograph:
Bossert, Walter, Clark, Andrew E., D'Ambrosio, Conchita and Lepinteur, Anthony 
(2019) Economic insecurity and the rise of the right. CEP Discussion Papers. 
Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, London, UK. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
  
ISSN 2042-2695 
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1659 
October 2019 
Economic Insecurity and the Rise of the Right 
 
Walter Bossert 
Andrew E. Clark 
Conchita D’Ambrosio 
Anthony Lepinteur 
 
 
    
Abstract 
Economic insecurity has attracted growing attention in social, academic and policy circles. However, there 
is no consensus as to its precise definition. Intuitively, economic insecurity is multi-faceted, making any 
comprehensive formal definition that subsumes all possible aspects extremely challenging. We propose a 
simplified approach, and characterize a class of individual economic-insecurity measures that are based on 
the time profile of economic resources. We then apply our economic-insecurity measure to data on 
political preferences. In US, UK and German panel data, and conditional on current economic resources, 
economic insecurity is associated with both greater political participation (support for a party or the 
intention to vote) and notably more support for parties on the right of the political spectrum. We in 
particular find that economic insecurity predicts greater support for both Donald Trump before the 2016 
US Presidential election and the UK leaving the European Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum. 
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1 Introduction
Preferences are fundamental for the understanding of behavior, and the social sciences
have devoted a great deal of attention to preferences in the sphere of politics. The ex-
isting literature in this area has considered a wide variety of correlates, including the
relationship between political preferences and income (Glaeser and Ward, 2006, among
many others), individuals’ social origins (Druckman and Lupia, 2000) and the role of per-
sonality (Malka, Soto, Inzlicht and Lelkes, 2014). Part of this latter work has underlined
the link between conservatism and the need for security and the ability to manage uncer-
tainty (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway, 2003, Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling,
Palfai and Ostafin, 2007, and Malka, Soto, Inzlicht and Lelkes, 2014); earlier work along
these lines emphasizing the roles of aversion to novelty and worries about security can be
found in Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950) and Rokeach (1960),
for example. Hibbing, Smith and Alford (2014) write that “Compared with liberals, con-
servatives tend to register greater physiological responses to [features of the environment
that are negative] and also to devote more psychological resources to them.”
Following this line of work, our main topic here is economic insecurity and its impact on
political preferences. A number of recent contributions have considered the link between
economic insecurity and, variously, support for populist parties (Guiso, Herrera, Morelli
and Sonno, 2017, among others), a lack of trust toward the EU (Algan, Guriev, Papaioan-
nou and Passari, 2017, Dustmann, Eichengreen, Otten, Sapir, Tabellini and Zoega, 2017,
and Foster and Frieden, 2017), the 2016 US Presidential election (for example, Inglehart
and Norris, 2016, and Mutz, 2018, among many others) and the 2016 UK referendum
on EU membership (Sampson, 2017, and Colantone and Stanig, 2018, among others).
Economic insecurity is proposed in these contributions as an alternative explanation of
populist preferences to a cultural backlash against progressive values, such as cosmopoli-
tanism and multiculturalism (as in Inglehart and Norris, 2016) or status threat, following
Mutz (2018).
Economic insecurity is an a priori plausible explanation for recent shifts in political
preferences, as it has arguably risen for a number of reasons: automation and the fear of
job loss, the Chinese import shock, and aging populations and migration, to take some
examples. There is no doubt that economic insecurity has appeared with increasing fre-
quency in policy debates and academic research following the Great Recession, with its
associated job instability and job losses, the marked decline of the middle class, and nu-
merous home foreclosures (along with stagnant housing markets) that have had a profound
effect on the lives of many. As a result, household optimism scores with respect to their
financial situation, savings, the threat of future unemployment and the economic outlook
in general have all dropped sharply, as reflected for example in the Consumer Confidence
indicator of the European Commission (see https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/indicators-statistics/economic-databases/business-and-consumer-surveys/latest-business-
and-consumer-surveys en).
Economic insecurity reaches beyond politics. Existing work has also proposed links
between economic insecurity and obesity (Smith, Stillman and Craig, 2013), suicide rates
(Reeves, McKee and Stuckler, 2014), mental health (Rohde, Tang, Osberg and Rao, 2016)
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and gun violence in US schools (Pah, Hagan, Jennings, Jan, Albrecht, Hockenberry and
Amaral, 2017). A related strand of literature has considered the potential intergenera-
tional transmission of parents’ insecurity to child future outcomes (Kalil, 2013, and Clark,
D’Ambrosio and Barazzetta, 2019).
Despite all of this interest, there is no established definition or measure of economic
insecurity. In the recent work on political outcomes noted above, economic insecurity
has been measured in a number of arguably ad hoc ways; that observation, in itself, may
be behind the lack of consensus regarding the drivers of the shift to the right. Algan,
Guriev, Papaioannou and Passari (2017) and Foster and Frieden (2017) measure insecurity
as the change in the unemployment rate; Inglehart and Norris (2016) by the Goldthorpe
class measure, the experience of unemployment, living on benefits, urbanization and self-
reported difficulty in living on the current household income; Dustmann, Eichengreen,
Otten, Sapir, Tabellini and Zoega (2017) as per capita income and the unemployment
rate; Foster and Frieden (2017) by current unemployment; Guiso, Herrera, Morelli and
Sonno (2017) as the first principal component of the experience of unemployment over
the past five years, self-reported difficulty in living on the current household income, and
exposure to globalization (approximated by the type of employment, industry and the
worker’s skill level); and last the change in family income between 2012 and 2016, looking
for work and the subjective perception of family finances in Mutz (2018).
A small number of proposed economic-insecurity indices have appeared in the more
general literature, including: (i) the Economic Security Index of Hacker, Huber, Rehm,
Schlesinger and Valletta (2010); (ii) proposals by the International Labour Organization
(2004) and Osberg and Sharpe (2009); and (iii) the index in Rohde, Tang and Rao (2014).
These are respectively based on: (i) the fraction of the population who experience a drop
in disposable family income of at least 25% from the previous year and lack an adequate
financial safety net; (ii) a weighted average of the ‘scores’ of different attributes as a
percentage of the population; and (iii) the volatility arising from incomes dropping below
the household’s overall trend. The Business Dictionary (www.businessdictionary.com)
defines economic security as “A situation of having a stable source of financial income
that allows for the on-going maintenance of one’s standard of living currently and in
the near future.” See Osberg (2015; 2018) and Rohde and Tang (2018) for a thorough
discussion and excellent surveys of these measures.
The main contribution of this paper to the literature is two-fold. We first propose and
characterize a class of objective individual measures of insecurity, as opposed to measures
that are self-reported or based on aggregate economic phenomena. We second show that
this notion of individual economic insecurity is related to political preferences in a number
of well-known datasets.
Our individual economic-insecurity measure reflects the confidence with which indi-
viduals face any potential future economic changes. This is argued to depend on their
past experiences of gains and losses in resources. As a consequence, the domain of this
measure consists of resource streams of varying lengths. The length of these streams is
not assumed to be fixed, as individuals are of different (economic) ages in a given time
period. Moreover, we allow resources to be negative, which is a realistic assumption.
The proposed index offers, in our opinion, a link between the two main explanations
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noted above of the determinants of recent political preferences—status threat vs. economic
insecurity. Insecurity does not refer to the levels of resources but rather to their changes;
an individual may for example be rich, and belong to the dominant cultural population
group, but still be insecure due to their experience of income changes. Our index of
insecurity is then one particular way of looking at past variations in economic resources
in order to measure individual anxiety about, and hence the threat of, what the future
may bring.
The first two properties of an index of economic insecurity that we employ are funda-
mental in the sense that we consider them essential for a mapping that assigns numerical
economic-insecurity values to resource streams. The first is that a gain (loss) from the
earliest period under consideration to the following period is associated with a lower
(higher) level of insecurity as compared to the situation where no such change occurs,
provided that the resource levels remain the same from the next-to-earliest to the cur-
rent period. The latter restriction to equal resource values serves to ensure that our
conclusions are reached without using unnecessarily strong assumptions; we note that the
resulting measures do, however, satisfy the requirement with a broader scope. The second
basic property ensures that specific movements within a stream have a higher impact the
closer to the current period they occur: more recent experiences carry a greater weight
in determining insecurity than those further in the past. Again, we limit the scope of the
requirement so as to avoid overly-demanding conditions. We think of the conjunction of
these two properties as a suitable set of minimal requirements to be met by an individual
insecurity index. This is analogous to the standard definition of an inequality measure
as an S-convex function—that is, a symmetric function that respects the Pigou-Dalton
principle of progressive transfers.
As with the measurement of income inequality, the defining postulates are compatible
with a wide range of possible indices. Further properties are thus needed in order to
produce more concrete proposals. Again, as is the case for essentially all social index
numbers, it would be too much to hope for a single measure that is universally accepted
as being the ‘best’ and, therefore, some additional properties are bound to be more con-
troversial than the fundamental requirements. The main theoretical result of this paper
is the characterization of a class of individual insecurity measures, the members of which
are based on geometrically-discounted resource differences. Only three parameters need
to be chosen: a discount factor that is common to past gains and losses, and two param-
eters that express the relative importance of aggregate discounted losses and aggregate
discounted gains.
We apply our individual insecurity measure to one of the vibrant areas of research
in the social sciences: the analysis of political preferences. First, we examine two of the
longest-running large-scale panel datasets and show that economic insecurity significantly
increases the probability of supporting some political party (and thus reduces abstention)
in both the UK and Germany. This finding is not in line with the predictions from the
theoretical model in Guiso, Herrera, Morelli and Sonno (2017), where insecurity is argued
to significantly increase the incentive to abstain.
Following up on this observation, we demonstrate that this greater participation is not
equally shared across the political spectrum: economic insecurity increases the support
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for right-leaning parties (the Conservatives in the UK and the CDU/CSU in Germany),
and to a lesser extent center parties (the FDP in Germany). In contrast, support for
left-leaning parties falls with economic insecurity (especially in West Germany). These
results hold in regressions controlling for current income, homeownership and current and
past unemployment, and are independent of the nature of the incumbent government.
They are stronger for the married and those with children.
The empirical part of the paper concludes with the examination of two recent notable
political events: the 2016 Presidential election in the United States and the 2016 United
Kingdom European-Union membership (‘Brexit’) referendum. Using data from the Un-
derstanding American Society and the UK Understanding Society surveys, our economic-
insecurity measure is shown to be significantly correlated with voting intentions: greater
economic insecurity predicts more support for Donald Trump and Brexit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and ax-
iomatically characterizes our measures of economic insecurity. The empirical relationship
between insecurity and voting behavior then appears in Section 3. We first use data from
two of the longest-running annual panel datasets, the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), to show that economic insecu-
rity predicts greater political participation (support for any political party or the intention
to vote) and that this support is for parties on the right of the political spectrum. We
then turn to two major political events of 2016: the election of Donald Trump and Brexit,
showing that our economic-insecurity measure predicts both. Section 4 is devoted to some
concluding remarks. The proof of our theoretical result (including the independence of
the axioms employed) can be found in Appendix A, and Appendix B contains additional
tables illustrating the empirical findings.
2 Measuring Economic Insecurity
To provide a formal definition of an individual measure of insecurity, we need to introduce
some notational conventions. We use 1m to denote the vector consisting of m ∈ N \ {1}
ones. For any T ∈ N, let R(T ) be the (T+1)-dimensional Euclidean space with components
labeled (−T, . . . , 0). Zero is interpreted as the current period and T is the number of past
periods taken into consideration. We allow T to vary as people alive in the current period
may have been born (or have become economic agents) in different periods. A measure
of individual insecurity is a sequence of functions I =
〈
IT
〉
T∈N
where, for each T ∈ N,
IT : R(T ) → R. This index assigns a degree of insecurity to each individual resource
stream x = (x−T , . . . , x0) ∈ R
(T ). We allow resources to be negative. As can be seen from
these definitions, we restrict attention to streams that involve at least one past period in
addition to the current period; this is because our indices are based on pairwise differences.
In an earlier contribution, Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2013) proposed and characterized
classes of linear measures of insecurity that bear a formal resemblance to the single-series
Gini and single-parameter Gini inequality measures (see, for instance, Donaldson and
Weymark, 1980, Weymark, 1981, and Bossert, 1990). The application of these Gini-type
measures requires the choice of numerous parameter values. In particular, the main result
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in Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2013) involves two sequences of parameters—with one pa-
rameter each for past gains and past losses in each time period under consideration. Even
restricting our attention to a finite number of periods, this requires a rather formidable
number of parameter values. Thus, the flexibility afforded by this large class comes at a
price: without further systematic restrictions, it may be difficult to make a sound choice
of what may be considered ‘suitable’ parameter values. Moreover, the measures charac-
terized in Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2013) fail to satisfy stationarity, a standard property
in intertemporal economic models. Stationarity implies that no significance is attached
to the way in which time periods are numbered, and it is necessary to avoid behavior
where, with the mere passage of time, plans that were optimal yesterday may no longer
be optimal today.
We begin by introducing two axioms that we consider essential for a measure of in-
dividual insecurity. The first of these ensures that a gain in resources from the earliest
period under consideration to the next is associated with a lower level of insecurity than
a situation in which no change occurs between these two periods. Likewise, a loss in
resources that occurs from the earliest period to the following produces greater insecurity
than no change. As alluded to in the introduction, we limit the scope of the property in
order to avoid the use of unnecessarily-demanding conditions. In particular, we assume
that a resource level p is obtained in all but the earliest period and require insecurity to
be highest (lowest) if a loss (gain) q is observed when moving from the earliest period to
the next.
Gain-loss monotonicity. For all t ∈ N, for all p ∈ R and for all q ∈ R++,
I t(p+ q, p1t) > I
t(p, p1t) > I
t(p− q, p1t).
A diagrammatic illustration of the axiom with t = 2, p = 0 and q = 1 is provided
in Figures 1, 2 and 3. According to gain-loss monotonicity, the stream in Figure 1 is
associated with more insecurity than that depicted in Figure 2 which has, in turn, a
higher level of insecurity than the stream in Figure 3.
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Figure 1: The resource stream x1 = (1, 0, 0).
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Figure 2: The resource stream x2 = (0, 0, 0).
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Figure 3: The resource stream x3 = (−1, 0, 0).
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The second fundamental axiom addresses the timing of specific variations in a resource
stream. Suppose that there is an increase from a resource level of p to a resource level
p + q in one period, followed by a drop from p + q back to p in the following period.
We think that, ceteris paribus, this first-up-then-down move generates insecurity because
the individual is discouraged by the immediate loss of a previous gain. To reflect the
hypothesis that more recent experiences are more influential the closer they occur to the
present, our property requires that a first-up-then-down move is associated with more
insecurity if it occurs closer to the current period. The same argument applies to a first-
down-then-up move in which the resource level drops from p to p − q in one period and
then immediately goes back up to p in the following period: the individual is encouraged
by the immediate recovery from a loss and, therefore, such a move is insecurity-reducing.
With the maxim of assigning greater significance to more recent experiences in mind, it
is natural to assume that a first-down-then-up move is associated with less insecurity the
closer it occurs to the present. Again, we limit the scope of the axiom to a relatively small
class of cases.
Proximity monotonicity. For all t ∈ N, for all p ∈ R and for all q ∈ R++,
I t+2(p, p, p+ q, p1t) > I
t+2(p, p+ q, p, p1t) > I
t+2(p, p, p, p1t) >
I t+2(p, p− q, p, p1t) > I
t+2(p, p, p− q, p1t). (1)
See Figures 4 to 8 for an illustration of the axiom with t = 1, p = 0 and q = 1, where
the resource streams are listed in decreasing order of insecurity: the stream in Figure 4
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produces more insecurity than that in Figure 5 which, in turn, has more insecurity than
that in Figure 6, and so on.
−3 −2 −1 0
−1
0
1
t
xt
Figure 4: The resource stream x4 = (0, 0, 1, 0).
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Figure 5: The resource stream x5 = (0, 1, 0, 0).
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Figure 6: The resource stream x6 = (0, 0, 0, 0).
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Figure 7: The resource stream x7 = (0,−1, 0, 0).
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Figure 8: The resource stream x8 = (0, 0,−1, 0).
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In addition to these two fundamental properties, we introduce some further axioms
that are of considerable intuitive appeal in our setting.
Linear homogeneity is a standard requirement in the theory of economic index num-
bers. Under linear homogeneity, a resource stream that is multiplied by a positive constant
produces insecurity that is multiplied by the same constant.
Linear homogeneity. For all T ∈ N, for all x ∈ R(T ) and for all b ∈ R++,
IT (bx) = bIT (x).
Our next property is that of translation invariance. This requires that the value of
the insecurity measure remain unchanged when the same amount of the resource under
consideration is added to the existing levels of the resource available in each period. As
for linear homogeneity, translation invariance is well-established in the literature.
Translation invariance. For all T ∈ N, for all x ∈ R(T ) and for all c ∈ R,
IT (x+ c1T+1) = I
T (x).
Quasilinearity establishes a link between insecurity comparisons involving resource
streams of different lengths. We use this term because of the structural similarity with
quasilinear utility functions in consumer-demand theory; see, for example, Varian (1992,
p. 154). In the insecurity context, under quasilinearity the insecurity IT (x) associated
with a resource stream x ∈ R(T ) can be expressed as a quasilinear function involving the
insecurity generated by the T most recent resource levels (x−(T−1), . . . , x0) and a function
of the resource levels x−T and x−(T−1) of the most remote past. This property is a variant
of a well-known axiom phrased in the context of economic insecurity.
Quasilinearity. For all T ∈ N \ {1}, there exists a function F T : R2 → R such that, for
all x ∈ R(T ),
IT (x) = IT−1(x−(T−1), . . . , x0) + F
T (x−T , x−(T−1)).
To obtain a class of measures the members of which employ geometric discounting,
the following stationarity property is essential. Stationarity applies to situations in which
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a specific stream is shifted a number r of periods into the past. The formulation employed
here differs slightly from the one that is familiar in traditional intertemporal models. This
is because, in our setting, the current period cannot be moved forwards or backwards. As
a result, some resource levels are repeated in the additional periods.
Stationarity. For all r ∈ N0, there exists an increasing function G
r : R → R such that,
for all t ∈ N0 and for all p, p
′, s ∈ R,
I t+2+r(p, p′, s1t+1, s1r) = G
r
(
I t+2(p, p′, s1t+1)
)
.
For instance, if t = 1 and s = 1, the property requires that
I3+r(p, p′,12,1r)
can be expressed as an (r-dependent) increasing transformation Gr of
I3(p, p′,12).
Clearly, the axiom could be strengthened to include more complex streams but, as before,
we state the above weak version which suffices for our purposes.
We now identify the insecurity measures that satisfy our axioms. As stated in the
following theorem, these indices employ geometric discounting—which, not surprisingly,
follows from stationarity. The relative weights of aggregate losses and gains are expressed
by means of the positive parameters ℓ0 and g0. However, it is worth emphasizing that
the discount factor δ that applies to losses must be the same as that attached to gains.
Furthermore, the possible values of δ must be below the smaller of the two ratios ℓ0/g0 and
g0/ℓ0, the other two parameters of the class of insecurity measures characterized below.
These parameter restrictions result from proximity monotonicity. Clearly, higher values
of δ correspond to greater importance being attached to previous experiences.
Theorem 1. A measure of individual economic insecurity I satisfies gain-loss monotonic-
ity, proximity monotonicity, linear homogeneity, translation invariance, quasilinearity and
stationarity if and only if there exist ℓ0, g0 ∈ R++ and δ ∈ (0,min{ℓ0/g0, g0/ℓ0}) such that,
for all T ∈ N and for all x ∈ R(T ),
IT (x) = ℓ0
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t>x−(t−1)
δt−1
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
+ g0
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t<x−(t−1)
δt−1
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
. (2)
It is immediate that if losses are to be given higher weight than equivalent gains,
then ℓ0 (the weight on aggregate discounted losses) must exceed g0 (that on aggregate
discounted gains). This implies that
g0
ℓ0
< 1 <
ℓ0
g0
9
and the minimum of the two ratios is g0/ℓ0. Therefore, the subclass of the measures
characterized in the previous theorem that respects such a loss-priority condition must
be such that ℓ0 > g0 and the discount factor δ be in the open interval (0, g0/ℓ0). Loss
priority is akin to the notion of risk aversion in decision theory and appears to adequately
capture the attitude of individuals who are concerned with their ability to absorb an
adverse event. We will therefore use parameter values that respect this condition in the
applied part of the paper.
The following example illustrates the class of measures characterized in our theorem.
Example 1. Throughout the example, suppose that T = 3 and the weights assigned to
aggregate losses and gains are ℓ0 = 1 and g0 = 15/16.
(a) Consider the stream x1 = (4, 12, 12, 16). We obtain
I3(x1) = g0
(
δ2(4− 12) + δ0(12− 16)
)
= −
15
2
δ2 −
15
4
< 0.
As resources never fall from one period to the next, the agent never experiences any losses
and, as a result, the resulting insecurity value is negative for any choice of the discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 15/16). In general, any stream without losses and at least one gain has a
negative insecurity value and, thus, produces less insecurity than any constant resource
stream.
(b) Now consider the reverse stream x2 = (16, 12, 12, 4). It follows that
I3(x2) = ℓ0
(
δ2(16− 12) + δ0(12− 4)
)
= 4δ2 + 8 > 0.
The agent never experiences any gains and, thus, the resulting insecurity value is always
positive. Clearly, any stream without gains and at least one loss has a positive insecurity
value and therefore is more insecure than any constant resource stream.
(c) Let x3 = (16, 4, 4, 12) ∈ R(3). In this stream, the individual experiences a loss of
12 when moving from three periods ago to two periods ago, no change in the period that
follows and, finally, a gain of 8 in the move from the previous period to today. For any
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 15/16), the corresponding value of the insecurity index is
I3(x3) = ℓ0δ
2(16− 4) + g0δ
0(4− 12) = 12δ2 − 15/2.
For any value of δ above (1/2)
√
5/2, the index value is positive (so that x3 is associated
with more insecurity than that from a constant resource stream); if δ is below (1/2)
√
5/2
insecurity is lower than that from a constant resource stream. Lower values of δ (a higher
discount rate) put more weight on the recent gain relative to the more distant initial loss.
(d) Finally, consider the stream x4 = (4, 16, 16, 8). It follows that
I3(x4) = g0δ
2(4− 16) + ℓ0δ
0(16− 8) = −
45
4
δ2 + 8.
For any value of δ below (4/3)
√
2/5, the index value is positive and x4 is associated with
more insecurity than the insecurity of a constant stream.
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In our empirical analysis we set ℓ0 = 1, g0 = 15/16 and δ = 0.9. We use the stream
of annual household equivalized incomes over the previous five years as the empirical
counterpart of x above. We have tested the sensitivity of our results to the choice of these
different parameters. As we will discuss in the section on empirical results below, our
qualitative conclusions are not affected by any reasonable changes in the values of ℓ0, g0
and δ.
3 The Rise of the Right
3.1 A Long-run Panel Data Analysis
As noted in the Introduction, social science has paid a great deal of attention in recent
years to individual political preferences in general, and the recent success of right-leaning
political parties. We now consider the individual-level economic-insecurity index devel-
oped above as a potential explanation of both phenomena. As our index requires panel
information on individual incomes, we use data from two of the best-known long-run panel
surveys: the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP).
The BHPS was launched in 1991, with annual surveys being carried out up to 2008. It
was then incorporated into Understanding Society, but only starting with the second wave
of interviews of the latter. The BHPS is a general survey that includes a random sample
initially covering approximately 10,000 individuals in 5,500 British households. Later
waves of this survey included new population groups and refresher samples that increased
the number of individual interviews towards 15,000 per year. It provides a wide range of
information on individual and household demographics, income, attitudes and political
preferences. There is no information about support for the UK Independence Party
(UKIP) in the BHPS: although the party has existed since 1993, it only achieved electoral
standing in the early 2010s. Our main variable of interest here is voting intentions,
measured as follows. BHPS respondents are first asked the following two questions. “Now
I have a few questions about your views on politics. Generally speaking do you think of
yourself as a supporter of any one political party?” and “Do you think of yourself as a
little closer to one political party than to the others?” If the respondent replies “Yes” to
either of these two questions, they are then asked which political party they support. On
the contrary, respondents who reply “No” to both questions are then asked, “If there were
to be a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most
likely to support?” Our measure of political preference is based on the combination of
the answers to these three questions, and individuals are considered as having no political
preferences if they reply “No” to the first two questions and “None” or “Don’t know” to
the hypothetical-election question. We exclude individuals who answered “Can’t vote.”
We then create a categorical political-preference variable, “Party,” with the five categories
“Conservative Party,” “Liberal Party,” “Labour Party,” “Other parties” and “No political
preferences,” where the named parties are ordered from right to left.
The SOEP is an ongoing panel survey with yearly re-interviews. The starting sample
11
in 1984 contained close to 6,000 households based on a random multistage sampling
design. A sample of about 2,200 East German households was added in June 1990, half
a year after the fall of the Berlin wall, and since then new samples have been added
either for particular population groups or as refresher samples. As in the BHPS, the
SOEP contains information about individual and household demographics, attitudes and
income. Political preferences are elicited by means of the following set of questions. “Many
people in Germany lean towards one party in the long term, even if they occasionally vote
for another party. Do you lean towards a particular party?” If respondents answered
“Yes” they were then asked, “Toward which party do you lean?” Our political-preference
variable in Germany has the five categories “CDU/CSU,” “FDP,” “SPD,” “Other parties”
and “No political preferences;” again, the named parties are ordered from right to left.
Later in the paper, we will explicitly distinguish “The Greens” and “Die Linke” from the
parties appearing in “Other parties.”
Our measure of individual economic resources in both samples is household equivalized
income, calculated by dividing household income by the square root of household size.
It is an open question whether individuals are more sensitive to movements in nominal
income or real income. We carry out our analysis using nominal income but provide a
robustness check to confirm that using real income makes no difference to our empirical
results.
The estimation samples for both surveys cover individuals aged between 18 and 65
who are not retired and who have valid information on economic insecurity, household
equivalized income and political preferences (we consider older respondents as part of the
robustness checks in Section 3.1.2). We do not use the first 1984 SOEP wave due to
income-measurement errors. Household income is also only available from 1992 onwards
in East Germany. This leaves us with data from 1985 to 2016 in West Germany and
from 1992 to 2016 in East Germany. There are 67,844 observations in the estimation
sample in the BHPS and 209,600 in the SOEP. We provide descriptive statistics on these
samples in Tables B1 and B2. The two samples are notably similar with respect to
mean age (around 41), percentage female (just over 50), percentage married (two-thirds)
and percentage employed (just over three-quarters); in contrast, the share of individuals
reporting “No political preferences” in the UK is only just under half that in Germany.
We might expect political preferences to be relatively stable over time at the individual
level. Tables B3 and B4 present the transition matrices for political preferences between
t − 1 and t. In both countries, the diagonal is heavily-populated, reflecting the stability
of individual political preferences over time. This in particular implies that it will be
difficult to run panel analyses of political preferences.
Regarding our key explanatory variable in the political-preference regressions, Figure
6 depicts the evolution of mean economic insecurity in the UK (on the left) and Germany
(on the right), where the 2000 value of the insecurity index in each country serves as
base 100. These are plotted together with the national unemployment rates (taken from
the OECD), revealing as expected a positive correlation between the two. There is serial
correlation in economic insecurity, as the t− 1 and t values share three out of four of the
changes in income that are used to calculate the index; even so, in the data an individual’s
economic-insecurity score always changes from one wave to the next, so that this is not
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synonymous with an individual fixed effect. Economic insecurity is negatively correlated
with current household equivalized income, but not particularly strongly so, with the
correlation coefficients being −0.4 in both the BHPS and the SOEP. In terms of the four
income changes that serve as the basis for the index, around 60% are positive and just
under 40% negative (with very few zeros). Only 10% of economic-insecurity observations
do not include a loss among the four income changes.
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Figure 6: Economic insecurity and unemployment over time – BHPS and SOEP
The general models of economic insecurity and political preferences we estimate are
as follows:
Supporti,t = β1HHincomei,t−1 + β2I
5
i,t−1 + β3Xi,t−1 + λt + ǫi,t (3)
Partyi,t = β1HHincomei,t−1 + β2I
5
i,t−1 + β3Xi,t−1 + λt + ǫi,t (4)
where Supporti,t is a dummy for individual i supporting any party and Partyi,t the party
supported, both measured at time t, HHincomei,t−1 represents the equivalized annual
household income of i at time t− 1, and I5i,t−1 is the value of economic insecurity of i at
time t− 1. As economic insecurity is calculated using information on household nominal
equivalized income, the standard errors in these equations are clustered at the household
level. We standardize both economic insecurity and equivalized household income in the
regressions, so that the estimated coefficients refer to the effect of a one-standard-deviation
change in these variables. The variable λt controls for year fixed effects, while the vector
Xi,t−1 includes a set of individual covariates measured at time t−1: age, gender, education,
marital status, number of children, labor-force status, homeownership and region fixed
effects. Homeownership here acts as a measure of wealth. Figure 6 suggests that we
should also take into account a possible confounding influence of unemployment (and
Algan, Guriev, Papaioannou and Passari, 2017, suggest unemployment as a determinant
of populist preferences). To do so, the vector Xi,t−1 includes dummies for the individual’s
recent unemployment (over the past four years). As we require income information over
a five-year period to calculate our insecurity index at time t− 1 (which is then related to
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political preferences at time t), our first observation on the dependent political variable
in these regressions comes from 1996 in the BHPS and 1990 in the SOEP.
As noted above, the BHPS was incorporated into Understanding Society starting
with the second wave of interviews of the latter in 2010. The BHPS respondents in
Understanding Society thus have missing values for their equivalized household incomes
in 2009, so that we could only extend our analysis (of political preferences in t to economic
insecurity measured over the five-year window between t− 5 and t− 1) to Understanding
Society starting in the 2015 wave. Our long-run analysis of UK political preferences in
general will thus refer to the 18 waves of the BHPS (although we will use cross-section
Understanding Society data below when we consider the Brexit vote).
Equation 3 is estimated using a logit model while, as in much of the economic-voting
literature, we estimate Equation 4 via a multinomial logit model. In the context of voting
decisions, it can be argued that multinomial probit models are more appropriate. Dow
and Endersby (2004) discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the multinomial logit and
multinomial probit models in the economic-voting literature. They conclude that while
the multinomial probit model does not rely on the independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives
assumption, its relatively difficult maximum-likelihood optimization procedure may fail
to converge and produce imprecise estimates.
3.1.1 Empirical Results
Table 1 asks whether economic insecurity at time t − 1 predicts future support for any
political party at time t. We show the marginal effects for economic insecurity, income
and homeownership (wealth) from Equation 3. The resulting coefficients on economic
insecurity are thus estimated holding both income flow and stock constant, so that we
do not confound insecurity with low income. The estimated coefficients in the first row
show that economic insecurity is associated with significantly higher political support at
the 1% level in both the BHPS and the SOEP: all else equal, a one-standard-deviation
rise in economic insecurity at t− 1 increases the probability of supporting any party at t
by 0.8 percentage points in the UK and 1.0 percentage points in Germany, corresponding
to one-third of the size of the marginal effects of equivalized household income and home-
ownership in both countries. The full set of results, including the estimated coefficients
on all of the control variables, appears in Table B5.
In Table 2, we show which parties benefit from this greater political engagement.
The estimates in the last column of both panels of this table, on the probability of not
supporting any party, are of course the mirror images of those for any party support
in Table 1. With respect to the actual parties supported, the results in Table 2 are
similar for the BHPS and the SOEP: economic insecurity mainly benefits right-leaning
parties (the Conservatives and the CDU/CSU) and, to a lesser extent, center parties
(the Liberals/FDP). Economic insecurity is not correlated with support for the SPD in
Germany, for the Labour Party in the UK and for the other parties in both countries. In
most cases, the economic-insecurity coefficient for support for a specific party is of the
same sign as the coefficients on equivalized household income and homeownership.
Economic insecurity therefore increases support at the right side of the political spec-
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Table 1: Economic insecurity and probability of supporting any party: Logit results -
BHPS and SOEP
(1) (2)
BHPS SOEP
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Observations 67844 209600
Log Likelihood -38563 -132737
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the household level. The figures are marginal effects.
The control variables include age, gender, education,
marital status, the number of children, wave dummies,
region dummies, labor-force status and dummies for
unemployment over the past four years. *, ** and ***
stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
trum. Recent research in psychology and political science (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski
and Sulloway, 2003, Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai and Ostafin, 2007, Ingle-
hart and Norris, 2016, and Walley, 2017) has underlined that individuals who value secu-
rity and stability are more likely to support conservative parties. The economic-insecurity
index that we propose using panel data on individuals’ past incomes thus appears to at
least partly capture this shift in political support towards the right.
To simplify the comparison between the BHPS and the SOEP we reduced the spectrum
of German political parties in Table 2. In Table B6 we relax this simplification by sepa-
rating “Alliance 90/The Greens” and “Die Linke” from the other-parties category (both
of which attract about five per cent support in our German sample). We first present the
full-sample results in Panel A. Then, as we may expect West and East Germans to react
differently to economic insecurity, we analyze these two regions separately in Panels B
and C. Economic insecurity never affects Green support in any panel. However, economic
insecurity does reduce Die Linke support in Panel A and, with West Germans representing
75% of the total estimation sample, similarly so in Panel B. The results in East Germany
are somewhat different, as economic insecurity still benefits right-leaning parties, but also
to a lesser extent the SPD (although the marginal effect here is not significantly different
from zero at conventional levels).
While Table B6 shows regional heterogeneity in Germany, Tables B7 and B8 consider
the results by time period, pre-2000 versus post-2000, in the BHPS and SOEP respectively.
The last column of each table indicates how economic insecurity at t − 1 affects the
probability of not supporting any party at t. In both tables, this estimated coefficient is
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Table 2: Economic insecurity and political-party preferences: Multinomial logit results –
BHPS and SOEP
BHPS
Conserv. Liberal Labour Other No Pol. Pref.
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.011∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.000 0.006∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.051∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.025∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Observations 67844
Log Likelihood -89876
SOEP
CDU/CSU FDP SPD Other No Pol. Pref.
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) 0.035∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.065∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.024∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 209600
Log Likelihood -229885
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. The figures are marginal
effects. The control variables include age, gender, education, marital status, the number of children, wave
dummies, region dummies, labor-force status and dummies for unemployment over the past four years. *,
** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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significantly negative only after 2000, with the difference from the pre-2000 effect being
significant at least at the 5% level. In Table B7, economic insecurity increases support
for the Conservative Party, but only significantly so post-2000. The pattern is somewhat
similar in Germany in Table B8: economic insecurity increases support for the CDU/CSU
in both time periods, but with a larger coefficient post-2000, and insecurity only reduces
“no political preference” in the more recent time period. In both Tables B7 and B8
economic insecurity benefits right-leaning parties to a significantly (at the 10% level)
greater extent post-2000.
Table B9 then explores potential heterogeneity in the relationship between economic
insecurity and political-party support at t by gender, marital status, parenthood and age.
Rather than presenting the full multinomial results by party (these results are available
upon request), Table B10 illustrates the estimated coefficient for right-leaning parties. In
Table B9 the relationship between insecurity and political support is somewhat larger for
women, but only significantly so in Germany. Economic insecurity has a greater effect
for the married and parents in both countries (at the 1% level, except for parenthood
in the SOEP), reflecting perhaps the greater vulnerability of those with a family. Last,
insecurity only affects political support for the under-40s in the BHPS. Table B10 shows
the estimated coefficients for support for right-leaning parties from the multinomial logit
regressions. The results here show that the shift to the right (from economic insecurity) is
larger for the married and (in the BHPS) for younger respondents and those with children.
We have also looked for possible moderating effects of income, splitting the sample into
those above and below median income, education and renters vs. homeowners, but found
no significant differences in any of these cases.
Finally, we ask whether the effect of economic security on political support depends
on the nature of the party in power. We first re-estimate Equation 3 separately for the
periods when Labour and the Conservatives were in power in the UK for the BHPS,
and when the Chancellor was from the SPD or CDU for the SOEP. We also look at the
parties that were in power during the period of calculation of our economic-insecurity
index (between t − 1 and t − 5). In both cases, although the estimated coefficient on
economic insecurity is often larger in absolute size when a left-leaning party is/was in
power, none of the differences in the requisite coefficients are statistically significant.
3.1.2 Robustness Checks
Our main results relate political preferences at t to economic insecurity at t − 1. This
relationship will not be causal if there is an omitted variable that simultaneously predicts
both past economic insecurity and current political preferences. To help control for this
possibility, we estimate a value-added model controlling for political preferences at t− 2.
The intuition here is that any time-invariant omitted variable that predicts both economic
insecurity at t− 1 and political preferences at t will be picked up by political preferences
at t− 2. The equation estimated is
Partyi,t = α1HHincomei,t−1 + α2I
5
i,t−1 + α3Partyi,t−2 + α4Xi,t−1 + λt + ǫi,t.
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The regression results from this value-added model appear in columns (1) and (2) of
Table B11. Compared to our baseline results in Table 1, the marginal effects of economic
insecurity (as well as those of household income and homeownership) fall by about 50%
but remain significantly different from zero. As economic insecurity is defined over the
period t− 1 to t− 5 we have also estimated a value-added model controlling for political
preferences at t − 6. The estimated coefficients on economic insecurity are somewhat
larger than those in the first two columns of Table B11, and are both significant at the
one per-cent level.
Liberini, Redoano and Proto (2017) and Ward (2019) have recently shown that sub-
jective well-being predicts voting behavior, and Algan, Beasley and Senik (2018) show
in French data that low well-being predicts support for the Front National. If insecurity
affects satisfaction (as shown in Clark, 2018) and satisfaction affects voting, how much of
our political-participation effect is mediated by life satisfaction? Columns (3) and (4) in
Table B11 re-estimate our main regression controlling for life satisfaction (note that the
BHPS sample size is smaller here, as life satisfaction is only recorded in waves 6 to 10 and
12 to 18). This does not change the estimated coefficients, so that life satisfaction does
not mediate the relationship between economic insecurity and political preferences.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table B11 check the convergent validity of our results by
considering a different dependent variable. Respondents in both the BHPS and the SOEP
are asked about their interest in politics (both on a four-point scale), and we re-estimate
Equation 4 by OLS with the dependent variable being interest in politics at t (the results
from ordered-logit estimation are the same). Economic insecurity increases interest in
politics in both samples (as do equivalized household income and homeownership), similar
to the results for any political-party support in Table 1.
Subjective evaluations of economic insecurity may play a role in our analysis. To ad-
dress this issue, the BHPS includes the question “Would you say that you yourself are
better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?” with the response categories
being “Better off” (30.2)%, “Worse off” (21.0%) and “About the same” (48.8%). We
add a dummy variable for major financial worsening over the past year to our baseline
specifications in Tables 1 and 2 (the results are available upon request). This attracts
a significant positive estimated coefficient in both tables: those who say that they have
become worse off are both more likely to support any political party and to support
right-wing parties. The coefficient is sizeable, being about half of that on standardized
equivalized household income. However, the inclusion of this subjective variable has al-
most no impact on the size of the estimated coefficient on (objective) economic insecurity,
which remains at the level seen in Tables 1 and 2.
Our main results consider the sample of individuals who are aged between 18 and 65.
The rationale for doing so is that the income streams of the retired are different in nature
from those of individuals of working age. We can re-estimate the regressions in Tables
1 and 2 including respondents of all ages, which produces very similar results (available
upon request).
The last two specification checks refer to the measure of income and the parameters
of the economic-insecurity index. We first check that our results continue to hold when
we use real equivalized household income in the construction of the index, as well as a
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control variable in its own right: this is indeed the case. Next, the economic-insecurity
index has three key parameters: the discount factor and the weights on aggregate losses
and gains. In our empirical analysis above these were set to 0.9, 1 and 15/16. To assess
the sensitivity of our results to these particular values we carried out a grid search, varying
the discount factor δ from 0.9 to 0.01 and the value of the gains parameter g0 from 0.9
to δ+0.01 (keeping the value of losses parameter ℓ0 at 1). The estimated coefficient on
economic insecurity in the SOEP remained at its baseline level across the grid; that in
the BHPS became insignificant when the discount factor dropped below one quarter for
any g0 between δ and ℓ0 or when gains were valued 40% or less than losses when the
discount factor was between 0.25 and 0.5, both of which may be considered as fairly
extreme parameterizations.
3.1.3 Comparing Different Indices
We now ask whether the insecurity index we propose outperforms other measures such
as that in Hacker, Huber, Rehm, Schlesinger and Valletta (2010) of a sharp (over 25%)
drop in available income over the past year, and the variance in household equivalized
income over five years. Note that the Hacker index also includes the lack of an adequate
financial safety net, but data constraints prevent us from including this dimension in the
index. As our index is based on movements in income, it might be thought that it is
similar to a variance. However, gains and losses can potentially cancel each other out in
our economic-insecurity index, making it different in nature to the variance in resources
(it is easy to construct profiles with positive variance but an economic-insecurity index of
zero). In both the BHPS and the SOEP, the correlation between the variance in income
and the economic-insecurity index between t−5 and t−1 is below 0.05. We also consider
the change in income between t− 2 and t− 1 as well as the trend growth rate in income
between t−5 and t−1 as predictors of political preferences. We apply the same approach
as in Clark (2001), comparing the explanatory power of each of these four alternative
income measures to that of economic insecurity. We introduce these measures in turn
into a regression with the same sample and set of controls: the best model has the least-
negative log-likelihood. The log-likelihood in Table 1 is −38318 (−132736) for the BHPS
(SOEP) with our index: these figures are reproduced in Columns (1) and (6) of Table B12
for ease of comparison. Columns (2) to (5) and (7) to (10) in Table B12 show the results
for the other indices, all of which produce log-likelihoods that are more negative than
that from our index. Thus, the economic-insecurity index we propose fits the data the
best compared to these different measures. We can alternatively introduce these indices
one by one into a regression that also includes our economic-insecurity index. In that
case, none of these new variables renders the estimated coefficient on economic insecurity
insignificant.
3.1.4 Potential Mechanisms
Many income movements happen for a reason: they may come about through a change
in family size or marital status (these are especially important as we use equivalized
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income in our analysis), or because of unemployment or ill health. In order to investigate
the role of observable life events in producing the economic insecurity we measure, we
consider four that may have occurred between t − 5 and t − 1, the time period of our
economic-insecurity index: marital separation, unemployment, a change in the number of
children and health shocks. In the tables we show below, the health shock is measured
as rise in the number of nights spent in hospital from one year to the next in the t− 5 to
t − 1 period: we find the same results if we consider entry into disability (as in Oswald
and Powdthavee, 2008) or changes in self-assessed health. We first re-estimate our main
political-support equation, as in Table 1, separately according to whether each of these
four events occurred, and then separately for individuals who experienced at least one of
these events versus those who experienced none of them.
The estimated coefficient on economic insecurity in Table B13 is never significantly
different across these pairwise comparisons (i.e. event occurred vs. event did not occur) in
the SOEP, so that the political effect of economic insecurity in Germany does not depend
on these life events having occurred. In the BHPS, those who experienced a change
in the number of children or a health shock (and those who experienced at least one of
the events) have a significantly larger estimated economic-insecurity coefficient than those
who did not. We might be tempted to then think that our main results in Table 1 actually
reflect an omitted variable: number of children and health both change income and affect
political support. This is however not the case in either of our datasets. With respect to
the four events in Table B13, number of children and unemployment both actually reduce
political support, with there being no correlation with health shocks or marital separation
(this pattern equally holds for support for right-leaning parties). Our preferred reading
of Table B13 is that, in the British data, it is the economic insecurity that results from
these two life events that helps shape political support.
Table B14 carries out an the same analysis for the probability of supporting a right-
leaning party, following on from Table 2. Probably the key finding in this table is that,
in both datasets, economic insecurity increases the probability of right-leaning support
for those who did not separate, did not experience unemployment, did not have more
children and did not suffer a health shock. To this extent, life events do not seem to lie
behind our estimated relationship between economic insecurity and support for the right.
3.2 The Election of Donald Trump
Our results above refer to two European countries. We now turn to US data, and in
particular to the 2016 Presidential election. To do so, we require data with both past
household income and current political preferences. To the best of our knowledge, the
only dataset with this information is the Understanding American Society (UAS, see
https://uasdata.usc.edu/index.php) survey conducted by the University of Southern Cal-
ifornia. UAS is a panel of households with approximately 6,500 respondents, and is
representative of the entire United States. The study is an Internet panel, where respon-
dents answer the surveys online at the time of their choosing. From the beginning of
the study on May 31st 2014 up until August 2018, the University of Southern California
carried out approximately 150 different UAS surveys on different topics such as politics,
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consumer behavior, financial literacy and health. Individuals in the panel could reply to
as many of these surveys as they wished (although in general only once to each one),
and each survey questionnaire included a standard set of socio-demographic characteris-
tics, including (banded) income. This therefore gives us theoretically up to 150 income
observations per individual from May 31st 2014 through August 2018.
The survey topic that interests us here is political behavior. This was measured in the
Election Poll Study wave of the UAS, run between July 4th 2016 and November 7th 2016,
in which respondents were asked to report their probability (on a 0 to 100 scale) of voting
in the Presidential election and their probability to vote for Donald Trump, Hillary Clin-
ton or any of the other candidates. Unlike most of the UAS questionnaires, respondents
could reply as many times as they wanted during the period in which the poll was open
(respondents replied on average 11.3 times). As for the other UAS questionnaires, ev-
ery time the individual responded they provided information on their socio-demographic
characteristics and income.
Overall 4,295 UAS respondents participated in the Election Poll Study, of whom 2,367
were between 18 and 65 years old, not retired and had at least five observations on
household income (either from the Election Poll Study or from previous UAS surveys
on other topics): on average, these 2,361 respondents have 28.5 income observations up
to their first participation in the Election Poll Study. Income in the UAS is measured
as an annual household figure in banded categories. For each income observation, we
calculate the annual household income by assigning the mean value per income band
using data from the Current Population Survey from the year of the observation under
consideration. We only keep individuals with at least five observations on household
income over the period from the start of the UAS to the closing of the Election Poll (i.e.
May 31st 2014 to November 7th 2016), and use the last five of their equivalent income
observations before the wave in which they report their political preferences to calculate
our insecurity index. As we now have observations at the daily level, rather than every
year as for the BHPS and SOEP datasets above, we use a daily discount factor δ between
observations calculated so that the discount factor over 365 days is 0.9, as in our annual
analyses above.
Our first OLS regression is based on the equation
Probabilityi,t = β1HHincomei,t−1 + β2I
5
i,t−1 + β3Xi,t−1 + λt + ǫi,t
where Probabilityt refers successively to the probabilities of voting on election day, and
voting for Trump, Clinton, or any of the other candidates. These are two separate ques-
tions, with all four probabilities being reported on a 0 to 100 scale, and even individuals
with a low or zero reported probability of voting give percentage figures for their sup-
port for the Presidential candidates. Respondents indicate their candidate support by
giving three separate figures, for Trump, Clinton and Other, which (by the design of the
questionnaire) have to sum to 100%.
Although individuals can reply multiple times to the Election Poll Study, our main
analysis refers only to the most recent political-preference observation per individual to
proxy for their actual voting behavior on the day of the Presidential election. We can
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nevertheless reproduce our results using all of the individual observations or the individual
mean of political preferences. The periods t and t−1 refer to the ultimate and penultimate
individual observations before the election. HHincomei,t−1 is the equivalized annual
household income of i at time t − 1, while the vector Xi,t−1 includes a set of individual
covariates similar to those in Equations 3 and 4. We cannot control for homeownership
as this information is not available in the UAS. We again standardize both economic
insecurity and equivalized household income in the regressions.
As in Section 3.1, we also estimate the following multinomial-logit regression
Candidatei,t = β1HHincomei,t−1 + β2I
5
i,t−1 + β3Xi,t−1 + λt + ǫi,t
where Candidatet is a categorical variable for the candidate to whom the survey respon-
dent assigns the highest vote probability. We cannot identify this variable in the 327 cases
where the respondent assigned either a probability of one half to each of two candidates or
one third to the three candidates. The complete descriptive statistics for the estimation
sample can be found in Table B15.
Table 3 shows the estimates on our economic-insecurity and equivalized household
income variables as predictors of voting intentions in the 2016 US Presidential election.
The estimated coefficient in the first column is of the same size as that in the BHPS and
SOEP: a one standard-deviation rise in economic insecurity predicts an increase of 0.68
percentage points in the probability to vote in the election, although the estimate is not
significant at conventional levels. The next three columns estimate the support for the
individual candidates. We weigh the percentage support individuals by the probability
that they will vote in the election (our rationale is that we should give less weight to
the preferences of those who have only a low probability of voting). Economic insecurity
predicts greater support for Donald Trump and reduces support for Hillary Clinton (with
no effect for the other candidates). We can alternatively estimate this OLS candidate-
support equation without this weighting, or excluding those who say they have a zero
probability of voting: these estimations produce very similar results. The full results with
all of the controls for Table 3 can be found in Table B16.
Columns 5 to 7 depict the marginal effects from a multinomial-logit analysis of the
preferred candidate, again weighting the vote probability: the results here confirm that
economic insecurity is associated with political support for the right. As in the OLS
regression, we find the same results if we do not weight by vote probability or if we drop
those with a zero probability of voting.
We consider potential heterogeneity in the estimated coefficient on economic insecu-
rity, as in Table B9 for the BHPS and the SOEP. There is no evidence of any significant
differences: economic insecurity increased support for Donald Trump for all of the de-
mographic groups we considered. Last, as noted above, the UAS is different in structure
to the SOEP and the BHPS, with observations being much closer together: the median
number of days elapsed between the t − 5 and t − 1 interviews was around five months.
We re-estimated the analysis in Table 3 using only those with above-median values of
this gap, producing estimated coefficients that are only slightly smaller in size (but lose
significance due to the smaller sample size of just over 1000).
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Table 3: Economic insecurity, voting behavior and political preferences: OLS and Multinomial Logit results – UAS
OLS Multinomial Logit
Probability to Vote (0-100): Preferred Candidate:
Election Trump Clinton Other Trump Clinton Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.676 2.128∗∗ -1.682∗ -0.443 0.025∗∗ -0.020∗ -0.005
(0.645) (0.945) (0.983) (0.608) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007)
Log(Eq. HH Inc.) (std) 1.532∗∗ 0.133 0.857 -1.025 -0.000 0.008 -0.008
(0.728) (1.009) (1.070) (0.742) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
Observations 2367 2367 2367 2367 2040
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.183 0.178 0.051
Log Likelihood . . . . -1527
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. The figures are marginal effects.
The control variables include age, gender, education, marital status, a white dummy, wave dummies, region
dummies, labor-force status and dummies for unemployment over the past five observations. *, ** and *** stand
for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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3.3 Support for Brexit
Our last empirical application considers the relationship between economic insecurity and
support for Brexit, using data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS),
also known as Understanding Society, which started in 2009. UKHLS is the largest panel
survey in the world devoted to social and economic research, covering around 100,000
individuals in 40,000 households in the United Kingdom. In Wave 8, UKHLS respondents
were asked the question “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European
Union or leave the European Union?” Wave 8 of Understanding Society was conducted
between 2017 and 2018, so that this question was asked more than a year after the
actual Brexit referendum on June 23rd 2016. Nevertheless, the wording of the question in
Understanding Society is the same as that used in the actual referendum and we consider
the response to this question as a reliable proxy for Brexit support (a related contribution
by Powdthavee, Plagnol, Frijters and Clark, 2019, considers the relationship between the
Brexit referendum outcome and subjective well-being in UKHLS data, as a function of
the prior Brexit preferences that the individual expressed). We estimate the following
equation via logit
Leavei,t = β1HHincomei,t−1 + β2I
5
i,t−1 + β3Xi,t−1 + λt + ǫi,t
where Leavei,t takes the value of one if respondent i stated that the United Kingdom
should leave the European Union and zero if it should remain a member. The independent
variables are the same as those in Section 3.1 and the estimation sample has the same
characteristics. Of the 13,381 individuals in the estimation sample, 41% replied “Leave
the EU.” The complete descriptive statistics of the UKHLS sample can be found in Table
B17.
Table 4 shows the marginal effects for the economic insecurity, equivalized household
income and homeownership variables; the full set of results appears in Table B18. The
estimated effect of economic insecurity is in line with all of the results presented above:
one standard deviation higher economic insecurity is associated with a one percentage-
point higher probability of stating “Leave the EU.” The effects of household income and
wealth (as proxied by homeownership) are both significant and are of the opposite sign:
individuals with more resources were more likely to prefer “Remain.” As for all of our
analyses, we last looked at heterogeneity in the estimated coefficient on economic insecu-
rity by demographic group. This produced only little evidence of significant differences in
the association between economic insecurity and Brexit support. Liberini, Oswald, Proto
and Redoano (2019) estimate the probability of supporting Brexit in Wave 8 UKHLS
data, with interviews from January 2016 to December 2016. Their key explanatory vari-
able of Brexit preferences is the response to the question “How well would you say you
yourself are managing financially these days?” They show that, conditional on income,
more negative responses to this question predict Brexit support. It would be of interest
to correlate such subjective financial evaluations with our insecurity index set out above.
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Table 4: Economic insecurity and the probability of supporting Brexit: Logit results –
UKHLS
Leave the EU
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.010∗∗
(0.005)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) -0.066∗∗∗
(0.006)
Homeowner (dummy) -0.065∗∗∗
(0.012)
Observations 13381
Log Likelihood -8626
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clus-
tered at the household level. The figures refer to
marginal effects. The control variables include age,
gender, education, marital status, the number of
children, wave dummies, region dummies, labor-
force status and dummies for unemployment over
the past four years. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1,
p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
4 Concluding Remarks
Economic insecurity appears to be on the rise, and is of obvious importance for social
cohesion, the understanding of changing inequality, and the perceived and actual effects
of public-policy choices. At the same time, there is no accepted standard economic-
insecurity measure. The first contribution of this paper is to propose and characterize a
class of individual measures of economic insecurity based on income streams (although
the general principle can be applied to streams of any kind of resource). We hope that
the measures presented here will be of use in future research in a wide variety of areas.
In a second step, we apply a member of this class of indices to data from long-running
large-scale panel datasets in the UK and Germany in order to examine how economic
insecurity affects political preferences. The results in both countries are unambiguous:
insecurity significantly increases political activism (in terms of the probability of support-
ing any political party), with this increased participation mainly benefiting parties on
the right (the Conservative Party in the UK and the CDU/CSU in Germany). Insecu-
rity is not a proxy for individual-level resources here, as its consistent significant effect
is conditional on individual income, homeownership, current labor-force status and past
unemployment. These results are more pronounced for the married, those with children
and younger respondents, have become notably stronger post-2000, and are not mediated
by life satisfaction.
We use US panel data to show that economic insecurity affected political preferences
before the 2016 Presidential election: the more insecure were significantly more likely to
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vote in the Presidential election and to vote for Donald Trump, and were less likely to vote
for Hillary Clinton. Last, we employ recent UK panel data to show that our economic-
insecurity measure predicts stronger support for Brexit. As above, these specific political
preferences are conditional on the individual’s current level of economic resources.
The notion of insecurity that we characterize and empirically analyze is specifically
based on movements in resources over time, and we refer to it as economic insecurity. Our
measure is correlated with political attitudes, as shown in the analysis of four different
datasets. However, economic insecurity as we understand it does not seem to be a synonym
for a more general or social variant of insecurity. Both the BHPS and the SOEP contain
questions on the fear of crime, and the SOEP on worries about terrorism. None of these
variables are correlated with our economic-insecurity index, suggesting that the latter
is more closely related to the economic domain. On the contrary, in the BHPS, the
economic-insecurity index is correlated with right-leaning economic attitudes (increasing
support for the private sector and reducing belief in the efficacy of trade unions).
We believe that these results are important. They first provide new evidence on po-
litical outcomes, showing that economic insecurity encourages political activism, but of
a certain kind: support for the right. Our work employs a fairly broad measure of polit-
ical preferences, by considering the political party (or position) supported. Considering
the relationship between economic insecurity and more specific economic and political
attitudes would seem to be a promising research area.
One salient question is why the shift to the right has taken place in recent years,
rather than in the more remote past. In Figure 6, German economic insecurity from 2005
onwards is not notably higher than previously, and that in the UK has risen from the early
2000s but still remains below the figures seen in the late 1990s. It may be that insecurity
matters more now (in terms of political preferences) than it did in the past, and indeed
our Tables B7 and B8 reveal a stronger effect on support for the right post-2000. At the
same time, our heterogeneity analysis in the UK and Germany highlighted a greater effect
for younger respondents (40 or under). We called this an age effect but in fact cannot
distinguish it from a cohort effect: it may well be the case that newer cohorts (and voters)
coming onto the political scene are more insecurity-sensitive.
More generally, we show that the theoretical work on socio-economic index numbers
can successfully be complemented by empirical research on large-scale panel datasets.
This allows us to test the index’s predictions and to compare the empirical performance
of different indices. In this latter respect, we find that our index of economic insecurity
predicts future political preferences better than a number of existing measures. Applying
this same test to other indices and more general individual outcomes constitutes a useful
project for the evaluation of the salience of different insecurity measures.
In conclusion, insecurity seems to provoke conservative responses. Our main finding
is of the same nature as that in the research on terrorism and voting, which has mostly
concluded that the former increases right-leaning support; see, for instance, Berrebi and
Klor (2006), Akay, Bargain and Elsayed (2018) and Bonanno and Jost (2006). Montalvo
(2011) is an exception here, suggesting that the switch to left-leaning parties following
the Madrid train bombings in 2004 was instead an indictment of the ruling (conservative)
party’s handling of the event. While terrorism thankfully remains relatively rare, our
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results here show that the widespread phenomenon of individual economic insecurity is
also associated with a significant shift in political preferences towards the right.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of the ‘if ’ part of Theorem 1. That gain-loss monotonicity is satisfied follows
because the values ℓ0δ
t−1 and g0δ
t−1 are positive for all ℓ0, g0, δ ∈ R++ and for all t ∈ N.
To see that proximity monotonicity is satisfied, let p ∈ R and q ∈ R++. Substituting
(2) in (1) yields
q
[
ℓ0δ
t−1 − g0δ
t
]
> q
[
ℓ0δ
t − g0δ
t+1
]
> 0 > q
[
ℓ0δ
t+1 − g0δ
t
]
> q
[
ℓ0δ
t − g0δ
t−1
]
which is equivalent to
δt−1 [ℓ0 − g0δ] > δ
t [ℓ0 − g0δ] > 0 > δ
t [ℓ0δ − g0] > δ
t−1 [ℓ0δ − g0] . (5)
These inequalities are satisfied because δ ∈ (0,min{ℓ0/g0, g0/ℓ0}).
It is immediate that linear homogeneity and translation invariance are satisfied.
To establish quasilinearity, define the function F T : R2 → R by letting
F T (y, z) =
{
ℓ0δ
T−1(y − z) if y ≥ z,
g0δ
T−1(y − z) if y < z
for all (y, z) ∈ R2.
That stationarity is satisfied follows from setting Gr(y) = δry for all r ∈ N0 and for
all y ∈ R in the definition of the axiom.
The following lemma will be of use in the ‘only-if’ part of the proof.
Lemma 1. A measure of individual economic insecurity I satisfies gain-loss monotonicity,
linear homogeneity, translation invariance and quasilinearity if and only if there exist
functions ℓ : N→ R++ and g : N→ R++ such that, for all T ∈ N and for all x ∈ R
(T ),
IT (x) =
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t>x−(t−1)
ℓ(t)
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
+
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t<x−(t−1)
g(t)
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
. (6)
Proof of Lemma 1. ‘If.’ To prove that quasilinearity is satisfied, define the function
F T : R2 → R by letting
F T (y, z) =
{
ℓ(T )(y − z) if y ≥ z,
g(T )(y − z) if y < z
for all (y, z) ∈ R2. That the remaining axioms are satisfied is immediate.
‘Only if.’ Suppose that I satisfies the axioms of the lemma statement. We prove the
requisite implication by inductively constructing the functions ℓ and g and showing that
(6) is satisfied.
Step 1. Let T = 1 and x = (x−1, x0) ∈ R
(1).
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Case (1.i). If x−1 = x0, the application of translation invariance with c = −x0 yields
I1(x−1, x0) = I
1(x0, x0) = I
1(x0 − x0, x0 − x0) = I
1(0, 0).
Linear homogeneity implies that I1(b · 0, b · 0) = I1(0, 0) = bI1(0, 0) for all b ∈ R++ and,
thus, it follows that I1(x−1, x0) = 0 whenever x−1 = x0.
Case (1.ii). If x−1 > x0, translation invariance with c = −x0 implies
I1(x−1, x0) = I
1(x−1 − x0, 0).
Using linear homogeneity with b = x−1 − x0 > 0, it follows that
I1 (x−1, x0) = I
1 (x−1 − x0, 0) = I
1 ((x−1 − x0) · 1, (x−1 − x0) · 0)
= (x−1 − x0)I
1(1, 0) = ℓ(1)(x−1 − x0),
where ℓ(1) = I1(1, 0). It follows from gain-loss monotonicity that ℓ(1) > 0.
Case (1.iii). If x−1 < x0, translation invariance with c = −x0 implies
I1(x−1, x0) = I
1(x−1 − x0, 0)
and, using linear homogeneity with b = −(x−1 − x0) > 0, we obtain
I1 (x−1, x0) = I
1 (x−1 − x0, 0) = I
1 (−(x−1 − x0) · (−1),−(x−1 − x0) · 0)
= −(x−1 − x0)I
1(−1, 0) = g(1)(x−1 − x0),
where g(1) = −I1(−1, 0). That g(1) > 0 follows again from gain-loss monotonicity.
Combining theses three cases, it is immediate that (6) applies for T = 1.
Step 2. Now suppose that T ≥ 2 and, for all x ∈ R(T−1),
IT−1(x) =
∑
t∈{1,...,T−1}:
x−t>x−(t−1)
ℓ(t)
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
+
∑
t∈{1,...,T−1}:
x−t<x−(t−1)
g(t)
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
(7)
where ℓ(t) > 0 and g(t) > 0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. The conjunction of quasilinearity
and (7) implies that there exists a function F T : R2 → R such that, for all x ∈ R(T ),
IT (x) = IT−1(x−(T−1), . . . , x0) + F
T (x−T , x−(T−1))
=
∑
t∈{1,...,T−1}:
x−t>x−(t−1)
ℓ(t)
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
+
∑
t∈{1,...,T−1}:
x−t<x−(t−1)
g(t)
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
+ F T (x−T , x−(T−1)).
We now construct the function F T . Because this function only depends on x−T and
x−(T−1), we can, without loss of generality, assume that x0 = . . . = x−(T−1); this allows
us to invoke the property of gain-loss monotonicity because all resource values other than
x−T are equal.
29
By assumption, IT−1 satisfies translation invariance. Thus, letting c = −x−(T−1), this
axiom requires that
IT (x) = IT (x− x−(T−1)1T+1) = I
T−1(x−(T−1), . . . , x0) + F
T (x−T − x−(T−1), 0)
= IT−1(x−(T−1), . . . , x0) + F¯
T (x−T − x−(T−1)),
where F¯ T (x−T − x−(T−1)) = F
T (x−T − x−(T−1), 0).
Linear homogeneity implies that F¯ T
(
b(x−T − x−(T−1))
)
= bF¯ T (x−T − x−(T−1)) for all
b ∈ R++. As in Step 1, we distinguish three cases.
Case (2.i). If x−T = x−(T−1), linear homogeneity implies F¯
T (b · 0) = bF¯ T (0) for all
b ∈ R++ and hence F¯
T (0) = 0.
Case (2.ii). If x−T > x−(T−1), linear homogeneity with b = x−T −x−(T−1) > 0 implies
F¯ T (x−T−x−(T−1)) = F¯
T
(
(x−T − x−(T−1)) · 1
)
= (x−T−x−(T−1))F¯
T (1) = ℓ(T )(x−T−x−(T−1))
where ℓ(T ) = F¯ T (1). Gain-loss monotonicity implies that ℓ(T ) > 0 so that the function
ℓ is positive-valued.
Case (2.iii). If x−T < x−(T−1), linear homogeneity with b = −(x−T − x−(T−1)) > 0
implies
F¯ T (x−T − x−(T−1)) = F¯
T
(
−(x−T − x−(T−1)) · (−1)
)
= −(x−T − x−(T−1))F¯
T (−1)
= g(T )(x−T − x−(T−1))
where g(T ) = −F¯ T (−1). Again, gain-loss monotonicity implies that g(T ) > 0 and, thus,
g is positive-valued.
Combining the observations of cases (2.i) to (2.iii) and substituting back into (7), we
obtain
IT−1(x) =
∑
t∈{1,...,T−1}:
x−t>x−(t−1)
ℓ(t)
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
+
∑
t∈{1,...,T−1}:
x−t<x−(t−1)
g(t)
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
+
{
ℓ(T )
(
x−T − x−(T−1)
)
if x−T − x−(T−1) ≥ 0
g(T )
(
x−T − x−(T−1)
)
if x−T − x−(T−1) < 0
=
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t>x−(t−1)
ℓ(t)
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
+
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t<x−(t−1)
g(t)
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
which completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of the ‘only-if ’ part of Theorem 1. Suppose that I satisfies the re-
quired axioms. By Lemma 1, there exist functions ℓ : N → R++ and g : N → R++
such that (6) is satisfied. It remains to be shown that there exist ℓ0, g0 ∈ R++ and
δ ∈ (0,min{ℓ0/g0, g0/ℓ0}) such that ℓ(t) = ℓ0δ
t−1 and g(t) = g0δ
t−1 for all t ∈ N.
First, we identify the class of parameter functions ℓ that apply to the losses experienced
in each period. This part of the proof parallels that of Theorem 4 in Blackorby, Bossert
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and Donaldson (1997). Let p, p′ ∈ R+ be such that p ≥ p
′, and let s = 0. Substituting
(6) in the definition of stationarity, we obtain
ℓ(t+ r + 1)p′ + ℓ(t+ r + 2)(p− p′) = Gr (ℓ(t+ 1)p′ + ℓ(t+ 2)(p− p′))
for all t, r ∈ N0 or, setting u
0 = p′ and u1 = p− p′,
ℓ(t+ r + 1)u0 + ℓ(t+ r + 2)u1 = Gr
(
ℓ(t+ 1)u0 + ℓ(t+ 2)u1
)
(8)
for all t, r ∈ N0 and for all u
0, u1 ∈ R+.
Now define y = ℓ(t+ 1)u0, z = ℓ(t+ 2)u1, ℓ(t+ r, y) = ℓ(t+ r+ 1)u0 and ℓ̂(t+ r, z) =
ℓ(t+ r + 2)u1. Substituting, (8) implies
ℓ(t+ r, y) + ℓ̂(t+ r, z) = Gr(y + z)
for all t, r ∈ N0 and for all y, z ∈ R+. This is a Pexider equation defined on the domain
R+ and, by definition, the possible values of the functions ℓ and ℓ̂ (and, thus, the possible
values of Gr) are bounded below by zero. Therefore, the solutions of this functional
equation are such that there exist functions d : N0 → R+ and e : N0 → R+ such that
ℓ(t+ r, y) = d(r)y + e(r)
for all t, r ∈ N0 and for all y ∈ R+; see, for instance, Acze´l (1966, p. 46 and p. 142). Also,
note that d and e cannot depend on t because Gr does not. Using the definition of ℓ, it
follows that
ℓ(t+ r + 1)u = d(r)ℓ(t+ 1)u+ e(r) (9)
for all t, r ∈ N0 and for all u ∈ R+. Setting t = 0 in (9), it follows that
ℓ(r + 1)u = d(r)ℓ(1)u+ e(r) (10)
and, therefore,
ℓ(t+ r + 1)u = d(t+ r)ℓ(1)u+ e(t+ r) (11)
for all t, r ∈ N0 and for all u ∈ R+. Setting r = 0 in (10), we obtain
ℓ(1)u = d(0)ℓ(1)u+ e(0)
for all u ∈ R+. Setting u = 0, it follows that e(0) = 0. Once this is established, we can
choose any u > 0 to conclude that d(0) = 1. Substituting (10) in (9), it follows that
ℓ(t+ r + 1)u = d(r) [d(t)ℓ(1)u+ e(t)] + e(r)
and, together with (11),
d(t+ r)ℓ(1)u+ e(t+ r) = d(r) [d(t)ℓ(1)u+ e(t)] + e(r)
for all t, r ∈ N0 and for all u ∈ R+. This is equivalent to
ℓ(1)u [d(t+ r)− d(t)d(r)] = d(r)e(t) + e(r)− e(t+ r)
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for all t, r ∈ N0 and for all u ∈ R+. Because ℓ(1) is positive and the right side of this
equation does not depend on u, both sides must be identical to zero and, therefore, it
follows that
d(t+ r) = d(t)d(r) (12)
for all t, r ∈ N0. Setting δ = d(1), a simple induction argument together with (12)
establishes that d(t) = δt for all t ∈ N. Setting u = 0 in (10), it follows that e(t) = 0 for
all t ∈ N0. Using this observation together with d(t) = δ
t in (10), we obtain
ℓ(t+ 1)u = δtℓ(1)u
and, choosing any u > 0, it follows that ℓ(t+ 1) = ℓ(1)δt for all t ∈ N0 or, equivalently,
ℓ(t) = ℓ0δ
t−1 (13)
for all t ∈ N, where ℓ0 = ℓ(1) > 0. Because ℓ is positive-valued, it follows that δ > 0.
To obtain the class of parameter functions g that apply to the gains experienced in
each period, we can reproduce the above argument with the hypothesis that p, p′ ∈ R−
are such that p ≤ p′ (instead of the hypothesis that p, p′ ∈ R+ are such that p ≥ p
′) to
obtain the existence of g0 ∈ R++ and σ > 0 such that
g(t) = g0σ
t−1 (14)
for all t ∈ N.
We now show that δ = σ. Using (13) and (14) in (1), proximity monotonicity requires
that
ℓ(t)− g(t+ 1) = ℓ0δ
t−1 − g0σ
t > 0 for all t ∈ N (15)
and
ℓ(t+ 1)− g(t) = ℓ0δ
t − g0σ
t−1 < 0 for all t ∈ N. (16)
If δ < σ, we can write σ = aδ with a = σ/δ > 1. Substituting in (15), we obtain
δt−1(ℓ0 − g0a
tδ) > 0 for all t ∈ N
which, because δt−1 > 0, is equivalent to
g0a
tδ < ℓ0 for all t ∈ N.
But this is impossible because a > 1 implies that g0a
tδ approaches infinity as t goes to
infinity and, therefore, this expression cannot be bounded above by the finite number ℓ0.
Analogously, if δ > σ, we can write σ = aδ with a = σ/δ < 1. Substituting in (16),
we obtain
δt−1(ℓ0δ − g0a
t−1) < 0 for all t ∈ N
which, because δt−1 > 0, is equivalent to
g0a
t−1 > ℓ0δ for all t ∈ N.
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Again, this is impossible because a < 1 implies that g0a
t−1 approaches zero as t goes to
infinity and, therefore, this expression cannot be bounded below by the positive number
ℓ0δ.
Therefore, it must be the case that δ = σ. Substituting in (5), proximity monotonicity
requires that δ < ℓ0/g0 and δ < g0/ℓ0, which completes the proof.
The following examples show that the axioms used in the theorem are independent.
(a) Let ℓ0 = −1, g0 = −15/16 and δ = 9/10 in (2). The resulting index satisfies all of our
axioms except gain-loss monotonicity.
(b) Let ℓ0 = 1, g0 = 4/5 and δ = 9/10 in (2). The resulting index satisfies all of our
axioms except proximity monotonicity.
(c) Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and define, for all T ∈ N and for all x ∈ R(T ),
IT (x) =
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t>x−(t−1)
δt−1
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)3
+
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t<x−(t−1)
δt−1
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)3
.
This index satisfies all of our axioms except linear homogeneity.
(d) Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and define, for all T ∈ N and for all x ∈ R(T ),
IT (x) =
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t>x−(t−1)
δt−1
(
x3
−t − x
3
−(t−1)
)1/3
−
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t<x−(t−1)
δt−1
(
x3
−(t−1) − x
3
−t
)1/3
.
This index satisfies all of our axioms except translation invariance.
(e) Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and define, for all T ∈ N and for all x ∈ R(T ),
IT (x) =
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t>x0
δt−1 (x−t − x0) +
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t<x0
δt−1 (x−t − x0) .
This index satisfies all of our axioms except quasilinearity.
(f) Define, for all T ∈ N and for all x ∈ R(T ),
IT (x) =
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t>x−(t−1)
1
2t− 1
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
+
∑
t∈{1,...,T}:
x−t<x−(t−1)
1
2t− 1
(
x−t − x−(t−1)
)
.
This index satisfies all of our axioms except stationarity.
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Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table B1: Descriptive statistics – BHPS
Mean SD Min Max
Political Preferences:
Conservatives [R] 0.18 0 1
Labour [L] 0.11 0 1
Liberal [L] 0.33 0 1
Other Party 0.10 0 1
No Pol. Pref. 0.27 0 1
Sociodemographic Variables:
Equivalized HH Income (log) 10.25 0.68 2.72 12.90
Economic Insecurity -1,968.28 5439.45 -14997.38 14999.84
Homeowner 0.78 0 1
Age 41.29 11.46 19 65
Female 0.54 0 1
Married 0.63 0 1
Separated 0.02 0 1
Divorced 0.10 0 1
Widowed 0.01 0 1
Never Married 0.24 0 1
No. Children 0.76 1.04 0 8
Employed 0.79 0 1
Unemployed 0.03 0 1
Out of the Labor Force 0.18 0 1
Observations 67844
Notes: [R] and [L] respectively indicate whether the party is right-leaning or left-
leaning based on the average position of the party in terms of its overall ideological
stance and the classification in Hix and Lord (1997). (Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill
Expert Survey.)
34
Table B2: Descriptive statistics – SOEP
Mean SD Min Max
Political Preferences:
CDU/CSU [R] 0.15 0 1
FDP [R] 0.02 0 1
SPD [L] 0.16 0 1
The Greens [L] 0.05 0 1
Die Linke [L] 0.02 0 1
Other Party 0.02 0 1
No Party 0.58 0 1
Sociodemographic Variables:
Equivalized HH Income (log) 10.38 0.56 0.69 12.94
Economic Insecurity -1,738.81 6,230.22 -29,978.79 29,979.42
Homeowner 0.50 0 1
Age 42.40 11.31 20 65
Female 0.52 0 1
Married 0.68 0 1
Separated 0.02 0 1
Divorced 0.07 0 1
Widowed 0.01 0 1
Never Married 0.22 0 1
Number of Children in HH 0.74 0.96 0 10
Employed 0.78 0 1
Unemployed 0.06 0 1
Out of the Labor Force 0.16 0 1
Observations 209600
Notes: [R] and [L] respectively indicate whether the party is right-leaning or left-leaning
based on the average position of the party in terms of its overall ideological stance and the
classification in Hix and Lord (1997). (Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey.)
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Table B3: Transition matrix – BHPS
Party supported at t
Conservatives
[R]
Liberal/SPD
[L]
Labour
[L]
Other
Party
No Pol.
Pref.
Total
Conservatives
[R]
9969
(79.5)
337
(2.7)
530
(4.2)
195
(1.6)
1509
(12.0)
12540
Party
supported
at t− 1
Liberal/SPD [L]
433
(5.7)
4869
(64.1)
830
(10.9)
278
(3.7)
1189
(15.6)
7599
Labour [L]
569
(2.5)
862
(3.8)
17739
(78.3)
488
(2.2)
2988
(13.2)
22646
Other Party
187
(2.7)
211
(3.0)
400
(5.7)
5131
(73.2)
1083
(15.4)
7012
No Pol. Pref.
1,489
(8.2)
969
(5.4)
2119
(17.7)
1103
(6.1)
12367
(68.5)
18047
Total 12647 7248 21618 7195 19136 67844
Notes: The parentheses contain the row percentages. [R] and [L] respectively indicate whether the party is
right-leaning or left-leaning based on the average position of the party in terms of its overall ideological stance
and the classification in Hix and Lord (1997). (Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey.)
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Table B4: Transition matrix – SOEP
Party supported at t
CDU/
CSU [R]
FDP
[R]
SPD
[L]
The
Greens
[L]
Die
Linke
[L]
Other
Party
No Pol.
Pref.
Total
Party
supported
at t− 1
CDU/
CSU [R]
24534
(75.7)
351
(1.1)
473
(1.5)
119
(0.4)
46
(0.1)
262
(0.8)
6,602
(20.4)
32387
FDP [R]
453
(13.4)
1937
(56.4)
86
(2.5)
32
(0.9)
13
(0.4)
38
(1.1)
842
(24.8)
3391
SPD [L]
554
(1.58)
112
(0.3)
24974
(71.2)
852
(2.4)
223
(0.6)
314
(0.9)
8067
(23.0)
35096
The
Greens [L]
103
(0.9)
113
(1.1)
729
(6.7)
7,570
(70.1)
124
(1.2)
217
(2.0)
1944
(18.0)
10800
Die
Linke [L]
37
(0.79)
15
(0.3)
230
(4.9)
209
(4.5)
2933
(62.7)
97
(2.1)
1153
(24.7)
4674
Other
Party
0
(0.00)
0
(0.00)
0
(0.00)
206
(11.1)
105
(5.6)
1553
(83.3)
0
(0.00)
1864
No Pol.
Pref.
6631
(5.46)
733
(0.6)
7414
(6.1)
1984
(1.6)
1121
(0.9)
1314
(1.1)
102191
(84.2)
121388
Total 32312 3251 33906 10972 4565 3795 120799 209600
Notes: The parentheses contain the row percentages. [R] and [L] respectively indicate whether the party is right-
leaning or left-leaning based on the average position of the party in terms of its overall ideological stance and the
classification in Hix and Lord (1997). (Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey.)
37
Table B5: Economic insecurity and probability of supporting any party: Logit results
with all controls – BHPS and SOEP
BHPS SOEP
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Age 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.030∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
No. children -0.006∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
High Education 0.095∗∗∗
(0.005)
Secondary Education 0.041∗∗∗
(0.006)
Years of Education 0.038∗∗∗
(0.001)
Married -0.019∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009)
Separated -0.069∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.011) (0.014)
Divorced -0.046∗∗∗ -0.018
(0.044) (0.011)
Widowed -0.088∗∗∗ -0.023
(0.015) (0.021)
Employed -0.014∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Unemployed -0.018 -0.036∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007)
N 67844 209600
Likelihood -38563 -132737
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the household level. The figures are marginal effects. The
non-reported control variables include the wave dummies,
region dummies and dummies for unemployment over the
past four years. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05
and p < 0.01.
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Table B6: Economic insecurity and political preferences: Multinomial logit results – West
and East Germany
SOEP
CDU FDP SPD The Die Other No
CSU Greens Linke Party Pol. Pref.
Panel A: Whole Sample
Econ. Insec. (std) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.000 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Log(Eq. HH Inc.) (std) 0.035∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.065∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.024∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006)
Observations 209600
Log Likelihood -244132
Panel B: West Germany
Econ. Insec. (std) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.001 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Log(Eq. HH Inc.) (std) 0.039∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.002 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.068∗∗∗ 0.003∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.038∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Observations 162575
Log Likelihood -193062
Panel C: East Germany
Econ. Insec. (std) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Log(Eq. HH Inc.) (std) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.012∗∗ -0.000 -0.009∗∗ 0.001 -0.035∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.049∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.014∗∗ -0.007 -0.028∗∗∗ -0.002 0.004
(0.010) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.013)
Observations 47025
Log Likelihood -50437
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. The figures are marginal effects. The
control variables include age, gender, education, marital status, the number of children, wave dummies, region dummies,
labor-force status and dummies for unemployment over the past four years. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and
p < 0.01.
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Table B7: Economic insecurity and political preferences: Multinomial logit results –
Before and after 2000 in BHPS
Conserv. Liberal Labour Other No Pol. Pref.
Panel A: Before 2000
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.006 0.003 -0.007 -0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) 0.028∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.004 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.012∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.003 -0.026∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010)
Observations 19660
Log Likelihood -26150
Panel B: After 2000
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.002 0.010∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.054∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.021∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 47884
Log Likelihood -63538
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. The figures are marginal
effects. The control variables include age, gender, education, marital status, the number of children,
wave dummies, region dummies, labor-force status and dummies for unemployment over the past four
years. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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Table B8: Economic insecurity and political preferences: Multinomial logit results – Before and after
2000 in SOEP
CDU FDP SPD The Die Other No
CSU Greens Linke Party Pol. Pref.
Panel A: Before 2000
Econ. Insec. (std) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ -0.005∗ 0.000 -0.002∗∗ 0.001 -0.004
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Log(Eq. HH Inc.) (std) 0.029∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.090∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.006∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.062∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009)
Observations 72732
Log Likelihood -82142
Panel B: After 2000
Econ. Insec. (std) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 -0.001∗ -0.000 -0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Log(Eq. HH Inc.) (std) 0.040∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.002 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.049∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.020∗∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.009
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007)
Observations 136868
Log Likelihood -161271
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. The figures are marginal effects.
The control variables include age, gender, education, marital status, the number of children, wave dummies, region
dummies, labor-force status and dummies for unemployment over the past four years. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1,
p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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Table B9: Economic insecurity and probability of supporting any party: Logit results – Heterogeneity in BHPS and SOEP
Panel A: BHPS Males Females Married Not Married Children No Children Below Age 40 Above Age 40
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.005∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.002 0.023∗∗∗ 0.001 0.012∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.016∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.012 0.028∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Observations 31124 36720 42306 25538 28563 39281 32819 35025
Log Likelihood -17029 -21455 -23183 -15300 -16899 -21580 -19947 -18490
Panel B: SOEP Males Females Married Not Married Children No Children Below Age 40 Above Age 40
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005 )
Homeowner (dummy) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ -0.003 0.034∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 100433 109167 141574 68026 92623 116977 92077 117523
Log Likelihood -65263 -67308 -89693 -42722 -57315 -75286 -56750 -75650
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. The figures are marginal effects. The control variables include age, gender,
education, marital status, the number of children, wave dummies, region dummies, labor-force status and dummies for unemployment over the past four
years. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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Table B10: Economic insecurity and the probability of supporting the right: Multinomial logit results – Heterogeneity in BHPS and
SOEP
Panel A: BHPS Males Females Married Not Married Children No Children Below Age 40 Above Age 40
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.059∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006)
Observations 31124 36720 42306 25538 28563 39281 32819 35025
Log Likelihood -41434 -48082 -55869 -33603 -36981 -52512 -42720 -46636
Panel B: SOEP Males Females Married Not Married Children No Children Below Age 40 Above Age 40
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) 0.038∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.064∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009)
Observations 100433 109167 141574 68026 92623 116977 92077 117523
Log Likelihood -117455 -111981 -156278 -73012 -97295 -132140 -94676 -134246
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. The figures are marginal effects. The control variables include age, gender,
education, marital status, the number of children, wave dummies, region dummies, labor-force status and dummies for unemployment over the past four
years. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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Table B11: Economic insecurity and probability of supporting any party: Logit results
– Robustness checks in BHPS and SOEP
Support any Party in t Interest in
politics in t
BHPS SOEP BHPS SOEP BHPS SOEP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Econ. Insec. (std) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Log(Eq. HH Inc.) (std) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
Controlling for:
Political pref. in t− 2 X X . . . .
Life Satisfaction . . X X . .
Observations 67844 209600 62151 209600 48109 206152
Log Likelihood -32040 -102420 -35224 -132666 . .
Adjusted R2 . . . . 0.129 0.192
Notes: Columns (1)-(4) come from logit regressions, and columns (5) and (6) from OLS regressions
of the four-point interest in politics variables. The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the household level. The figures are marginal effects. The control variables include age, gender,
education, marital status, the number of children, wave dummies, region dummies, labor-force status
and dummies for unemployment over the past four years. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05
and p < 0.01.
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Table B12: Economic insecurity and probability of supporting any party: Logit results – Other insecurity measures in BHPS and
SOEP
Support any Party in t
BHPS SOEP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Econ. Insec. (std) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Hacker’s Index (dummy) 0.003 0.023∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Variance HH Income (std) 0.003 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
∆ Yt−1 (std) -0.003
∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
Trend (std) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Log(Eq. HH Inc.) (std) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Homeowner (dummy) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 67844 67844 67844 67844 67844 209600 209600 209600 209600 209600
Log Likelihood -38563 -38573 -38571 -38571 -38566 -132737 -132754 -132759 -132755 -132751
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. The figures are marginal effects. The control variables include age, gender,
education, marital status, the number of children, wave dummies, region dummies, labor-force status and dummies for unemployment over the past four
years. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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Table B13: Economic insecurity and the probability of supporting any party: Logit results – Mechanisms in BHPS and SOEP
Panel A: BHPS Separation
No
Separation Unemp.
No
Unemp.
Change in
No. Children
No Change in
No. Children
Health
Shock
No Health
Shock
At least
one Event
None of
the Events
Economic Insecurity 0.004 0.009∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.002 0.016∗∗∗ 0.002 0.015∗∗∗ -0.004
(std) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(Eq. HH Income) 0.025∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(std) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Homeowner -0.027 0.026∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(dummy) (0.031) (0.006) (0.020) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 2431 65413 5238 62606 20952 47252 13601 39983 27067 26517
Log Likelihood -1495 -37019 -3199 -35316 -12079 -26419 -7844 -22073 -15616 -14285
Panel B: SOEP Separation
No
Separation Unemp.
No
Unemp.
Change in
No. Children
No Change in
No. Children
Health
Shock
No Health
Shock
At least
one Event
None of
the Events
Economic Insecurity 0.010 0.010∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(std) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(Eq. HH Income) 0.036∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(std) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.04) (0.005) (0.005)
Homeowner 0.028 0.027∗∗∗ 0.018 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.009 0.021∗∗∗ 0.009
(dummy) (0.020) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 7063 202537 23322 186278 27719 181881 43951 113007 67568 89391
Log Likelihood -4437 -128245 -13565 -119093 -17049 -115614 -27331 -71572 -41702 -571999
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. The figures are marginal effects. The control variables include age, gender, education, marital
status, the number of children, wave dummies, region dummies, labor-force status and dummies for unemployment over the past four years. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1,
p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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Table B14: Economic insecurity and probability of supporting a right-leaning party: Multinomial Logit results – Mechanisms in BHPS and SOEP
Panel A: BHPS Separation
No
Separation Unemp.
No
Unemp.
Change in
No. Children
No Change in
No. Children
Health
Shock
No Health
Shock
At least
one Event
None of
the Events
Economic Insecurity 0.003 0.012∗∗∗ 0.003 0.012∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.005∗
(std) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(Eq. HH Income) 0.022∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(std) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Homeowner 0.009 0.054∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(dummy) (0.022) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 2431 65413 5238 62606 20952 47252 13601 39983 27067 26517
Log Likelihood -3058 -84220 -1555 -87367 -9424 -79473 -17602 -54155 -15614 -73297
Panel B: SOEP Separation
No
Separation Unemp.
No
Unemp.
Change in
No. Children
No Change in
No. Children
Health
Shock
No Health
Shock
At least
one Event
None of
the Events
Economic Insecurity 0.009 0.012∗∗∗ 0.005 0.013∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(std) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log(Eq. HH Income) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(std) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Homeowner 0.030∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(dummy) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 7063 202537 23322 186278 27719 181881 43951 113007 67568 89391
Log Likelihood -7434 -222276 -20642 -208404 -28593 -201044 -47177 -125679 -71207 -101670
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. The figures are marginal effects. The control variables include age, gender, education, marital
status, the number of children, wave dummies, region dummies, labor-force status and dummies for unemployment over the past four years. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1,
p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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Table B15: Descriptive statistics – UAS
Mean SD Min Max
Political Preferences:
Probability to Vote 84.85 31.74 0 100
Probability to Vote for Trump 44.03 45.29 0 100
Probability to Vote for Clinton 39.90 44.60 0 100
Probability to Vote for Other 16.02 32.03 0 100
Sociodemographic Variables:
Equivalized HH Income (log) 9.72 1.29 6.20 12.40
Economic Insecurity -99.07 1086.91 -4990.56 4964.77
Age 42.11 11.22 18 65
Female 0.60 0 1
White 0.86 0 1
No college degree 0.49 0 1
College degree 0.37 0 1
More than College degree 0.13 0 1
Married 0.59 0 1
Separated 0.02 0 1
Divorced 0.14 0 1
Widowed 0.01 0 1
No. HH Members 2.98 1.48 1 11
Employed 0.72 0 1
Unemployed 0.08 0 1
Out of the Labor Force 0.20 0 1
Observations 2361
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Table B16: Economic insecurity, voting behavior and political preferences: OLS results
with full controls - UAS
OLS - Probability to Vote (0-100):
Election Trump Clinton Other
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.665 2.128∗∗ -1.682∗ -0.444
(0.645) (0.937) (0.983) (0.604)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) 1.492∗∗ 0.110 0.860 -1.005
(0.728) (1.082) (1.068) (0.741)
Age 0.315∗∗∗ 0.071 0.205∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.098) (0.097) (0.069)
Female 0.438 -5.469∗∗∗ 6.053∗∗∗ -0.639
(1.366) (2.031) (1.994) (1.386)
White -2.924 36.879∗∗∗ -37.189∗∗∗ 0.622
(2.035) (2.542) (2.980) (2.018)
High Education -9.408∗∗∗ 22.962∗∗∗ -21.041∗∗∗ -1.849
(2.114) (3.056) (3.164) (2.247)
Secondary Education -0.883 12.280∗∗∗ -13.151∗∗∗ 0.766
(2.099) (3.051) (3.204) (2.214)
Married 3.138∗ 14.988∗∗∗ -17.921∗∗∗ 3.218∗
(1.779) (2.539) (2.670) (1.838)
Separated -3.192 7.635 -9.489 2.207
(4.852) (6.588) (6.123) (4.437)
Divorced 0.474 10.296∗∗∗ -14.219∗∗∗ 4.282∗
(2.407) (3.434) (3.538) (2.417)
Widowed 4.739 16.032∗ -25.568∗∗∗ 10.033
(5.758) (8.884) (8.227) (6.948)
Employed 3.799∗∗ 2.639 -2.104 -0.290
(1.727) (2.553) (2.560) (1.810)
Unemployed -1.064 4.813 -1.065 -3.449
(2.763) (4.102) (4.150) (2.552)
Observations 2367 2367 2367 2367
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.196 0.193 0.040
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. The
figures are marginal effects. The non-reported control variables include wave dummies,
region dummies and dummies for unemployment over the past five observations. *, **
and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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Table B17: Descriptive statistics – UKHLS
Mean SD Min Max
Political Preferences:
Leave the EU 0.41 0 1
Sociodemographic Variables:
Equivalized HH Income (log) 10.08 0.60 3.91 11.87
Economic Insecurity -2304.54 10180.34 -44663.60 33999.38
Homeowner 0.73 0 1
Age 42.87 10.74 19 65
Female 0.57 0 1
Married 0.59 0 1
Separated 0.02 0 1
Divorced 0.09 0 1
Widowed 0.01 0 1
Never Married 0.30 0 1
Number of Children in HH 0.77 1.03 0 9
Employed 0.82 0 1
Unemployed 0.04 0 1
Out of the Labor Force 0.14 0 1
Observations 13381
50
Table B18: Economic insecurity and the probability of supporting Brexit: Logit results
with full controls – UKHLS
Leave the EU
Economic Insecurity (std) 0.010∗∗
(0.005)
Log(Eq. HH Income) (std) -0.066∗∗∗
(0.006)
Homeowner (dummy) -0.065∗∗∗
(0.006)
Age 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000)
Female -0.066∗∗∗
(0.007)
No. children 0.001
(0.005)
High Education -0.040∗∗∗
(0.004)
Secondary Education -0.026∗∗∗
(0.005)
Married 0.029∗∗
(0.013)
Separated 0.027
(0.029)
Divorced 0.075∗∗∗
(0.018)
Widowed -0.004
(0.043)
Employed -0.023∗
(0.013)
Unemployed 0.044∗
(0.024)
Observations 13381
Log Likelihood -8626
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses are clus-
tered at the household level. The figures are marginal
effects. The non-reported control variables include
wave dummies, region dummies and dummies for
unemployment over the past five observations. *, **
and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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